This paper integrates the problem of designing corporate bankruptcy rules into a theory of optimal debt structure. We show that, in an incomplete contract framework with imperfect renegotiation, having multiple creditors increases a …rm's debt capacity while increasing its incentives to default strategically. The optimal debt contract gives creditors claims that are jointly inconsistent in case of default. Bankruptcy rules, therefore, are a necessary part of the overall …nanc-ing contract, to make claims consistent and to prevent a value reducing run for the assets of the …rm.
Introduction
Bankruptcy law regulates the interaction between debtors and creditors when debtors default and the parties cannot work out their di¤erences outside the courts. The law addresses two main types of con ‡icts: con ‡icts between a debtor and her creditors, and con ‡icts among creditors themselves. Most contributions to the large literature on bankruptcy law focus on ex-post con‡icts. In particular, con ‡icts among creditors, the major source of complexity in modern bankruptcy law, have been analyzed from an ex-post perspective. But the design of bankruptcy law also in ‡uences initial …nancing and valuation of the …rm. In fact, the problem is most interesting when posed in an ex-ante framework; it raises what seems like a paradox: if bankruptcy with multiple creditors is so complex, why would a …rm contract with several creditors in the …rst place? Put di¤erently: if con ‡icts of interest must be resolved ex post anyhow and these resolutions are costly, why create them ex ante? We attempt to answer these questions in an optimal contracting approach to corporate debt and bankruptcy.
The link between ex ante and ex post e¢ciency has been analyzed extensively in the capital structure literature. It is by now a standard result in that literature that having multiple creditors or multiple investors is a way of increasing ex ante e¢ciency of contracting at the cost of reducing ex post e¢ciency (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996, Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Berglöf and von Thadden, 1994) . Having multiple investors with con ‡icting interests tends to increase the costs of contract renegotiation, thereby increasing commitment and increasing ex ante e¢ciency. The latter takes the form of reduced incentives to strategically default on debt or of increased incentives to provide e¤ort, present good investment projects, etc. In the logic of that literature, higher ex ante e¢ciency, and in particular reduced incentives for strategic default, increase the capacity to raise funds. From the perspective of bankruptcy law, this literature tends to suggest that it is important to create ex post ine¢cien-cies so as to reduce the ex ante incentives for strategic default and thus to enhance the debt capacity of …rms.
In this paper, we borrow from that literature to analyze the choice of a single versus multiple creditors and its e¤ect on incentives for strategic default. We start from the observation that multiple creditors make contract renegotiations more di¢cult and emphasize a) the ex post con ‡icts among multiple creditors, and b) the role of bankruptcy law in solving such con-‡icts from an ex ante perspective. Contrary to the standard result of the capital structure literature, we present a model where having multiple creditors increases the capacity to raise funds while at the same time increasing, instead of decreasing, the occurrence of strategic default. Having multiple creditors allows for overleveraging of the assets of a …rm by giving to each individual creditor foreclosure rights over assets that are individually feasible but jointly inconsistent. The capacity to raise funds is increased because the total repayment obligations stemming from individual foreclosure rights are higher than if the …rm faced a single creditor. In other words, having multiple creditors can serve as an instrument for the …rm to commit itself credibly to higher debt repayments than if it were facing a single creditor. These higher repayment obligations, however, also increase at the margin the incentives for strategic default. When the …rm defaults on its debt, the sum of claims held by individual creditors exceeds the value of the …rm's assets. This is where bankruptcy rules step in. Their role is to reconcile the inconsistent claims of creditors. We thus take the view, shared by many scholars of law and economics, that "bankruptcy is a situation in which existing claims are inconsistent " (Hart, 1995) . In our model, the need for bankruptcy rules arises endogenously because inconsistency of the claims of creditors are not the result of chance or irrationality but is the result of optimal contract design.
To provide an intuition for why two investors are better than one, consider a …rm negotiating with two investors to …nance a project. In an incomplete contracts approach, the project generates some veri…able assets and some unveri…able cash ‡ows in the future. With only one investor, the …rm's commitment ability is, in principle, limited by the amount of veri…able assets available for foreclosure should the …rm default. However, this constraint is relaxed with two investors; the …rm can promise up to the full amount of available assets to each one of the investors. When the …rm only defaults on one investor, this investor has the right to foreclose on the …rm's assets to collect her debt. If the …rm defaults on both creditors, and one creditor calls the sheri¤ to enforce the payment, the other creditor can …le for bankruptcy. In this case, the sum of the two claims will be larger than the available amount of veri…able assets and individual claims will then have to be adjusted by the court. To make creditor claims compatible with available assets is, from our point of view, one of the essential functions of a bankruptcy court.
When the …rm has su¢cient cash ‡ows to pay o¤ investors, two investors will extract strictly more from the …rm than would one investor. Indeed, the overleveraging of the …rm's asset base forces the …rm to higher repay-ment obligations with multiple creditors as compared to a single creditor. Such higher repayment obligations are credible because individual creditors can always exercise their individual liquidation rights in case of default on their loan. It is then in the …rm's interest to meet these higher repayment obligations in order not to forego high continuation values. These higher repayment obligations, however, increase the incentives for strategic default. Of course, when the …rm has no cash ‡ows, it is forced to default on both investors. There will, in other words, sometimes be liquidation in the good cash- ‡ow state and always in the bad cash- ‡ow state. Since liquidation is ex post ine¢cient, the optimal contract minimizes expected liquidation while ensuring that investors are repaid in expectation. The fundamental tradeo¤ is between lowering liquidation in bankruptcy, reducing the likelihood of strategic default, and increasing the incentives to pay out cash when available.
Our results lead to the prediction that …rms with large capital requirements (per unit of asset generated) should have multiple investors. These …rms should also be "overleveraged", i.e., the promised debt payments should be larger than the value of veri…able assets. Despite this feature, our results are compatible with the observation in many countries of low retrieval rates of creditors, in particular junior creditors, once …rms are in bankruptcy (see Weiss (1990) and Anderson and Sundarajan (1996) ). In fact, the model predicts that in bankruptcy the debtor retains some of her assets and junior creditors receive a smaller fraction of their claims than senior creditors (who are satis…ed at par). As a corollary, absolute priority -the notion that creditors must be satis…ed fully in bankruptcy before owners are to retain something -is violated in the present model. Again, this is consistent with the empirical literature.
Unlike most other contributions, this paper is consistent with the observation that solvent …rms in real life actually enter into bankruptcy procedures. We ask how the prospect of such a procedure a¤ects the choice of capital structure ex ante. In particular, we provide an explanation to our initial puzzle why the contracting parties introduce the ex post con ‡ict between creditors (the overleveraging of its assets) and the design of a procedurebankruptcy -to deal with this con ‡ict. In the model, giving the creditors the right to trigger bankruptcy, possibly in combination with an appropriate priority structure, improves strictly upon the no-bankruptcy contract, in which liquidation claims are not coordinated after default. The notion of debtor-creditor law in the model is still rudimentary, but we believe it captures some fundamental elements of an optimal bankruptcy procedure. Bankruptcy is triggered when a creditor …les to prevent his claims from being eroded through debt collection of other creditors. The procedure demands an "automatic stay" ensuring that liquidation claims are …led simultaneously. Finally, the bankruptcy court has to establish a new capital structure compatible with the value of the assets available to distribute among creditors.
An important strand of the by now large literature on bankruptcy law focuses on optimal procedural and substantial rules, taking as given preexisting debt contracts and the decision to enter bankruptcy (see Bebchuk (1988) , Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992) or Cornelli and Felli (1998) ). This work rightly points out that the choice of capital structure in ‡uences what happens and what should happen in bankruptcy. Yet, it is silent on the determinants of capital structure, which is problematic as the choice of bankruptcy law, or more generally debtor-creditor law, will impact on the …rm's capital structure decision. In fact, these two issues are interrelated; even on a comparative international level for example, Rajan and Zingales (1995) , White (1996), and LaPorta et al. (1998) show interesting correlations between …-nancing patterns and legal rules.
Another interesting strand of research has looked at the bankruptcy problem from an ex-ante perspective. Building on the early work of Bulow and Shoven (1978) , contributions such as those by Bebchuk and Picker (1996) , Berkovitch, Israel, and Zender (1998), or Schwartz (1998) analyse the impact of bankruptcy on debtors' incentives prior to bankruptcy. Cornelli and Felli (1997) have considered ex-ante incentives by creditors, and Berkovitch and Israel (1999) and Povel (1996) focus on the problem of information transmission between debtor and creditor, with interesting recommendations concerning whether a code should allow debtors or creditors, or both, to trigger bankruptcy. Kordana and Posner (1999) discuss the complex voting features associated with the American Chapter 11. Like our paper, they focus on the tradeo¤ between reducing the cost of liquidation by lowering individual pre-bankruptcy entitlements and discouraging strategic default. Their analysis, like Berkovitch and Israel (1999) and Povel (1997) and unlike ours, is concerned with asymmetric information among investors. These ex-ante analyses are not concerned with the key question of our paper, why a …rm has multiple creditors in the …rst place.
The literature on capital structure and multiple investors focuses on the commitment advantages of having multiple investors within a given legal context. Utilizing the return characteristics of debt and equity Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) show that having multiple investors holding either of these instruments is optimal under certain assumptions about the return characteristics of strategic actions. Equity-holders who care about expected continuation value tend in general to be ex post too soft on debtors. On the other hand, creditors are biased towards excess toughness because their primary concern is recovering their loan. Having both creditors and equity-holders can optimally trade o¤ better ex ante incentives for the …rm against ex post ine¢ciency of foregoing continuation values. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) suggest that by having many small investors, rather than one big bank, a …rm can improve its commitment ability ex ante not to re…nance unpro…table projects ex post, i.e., it hardens the …rm's budget constraint. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) demonstrate that in ex post bargaining under imperfect information two creditors may extract more from the …rm than could a single creditor, thereby reducing its incentives to default strategically. Berglöf and von Thadden (1994) show that it is optimal for …rms to separate claims across time and states of nature. The optimal capital structure in their model has a short-term investor with collateralized senior debt and long-term investors with junior state-contingent claims (and sometimes …xed claims).
In that literature, there is no natural rationale for the need for a bankruptcy law reconciling claims of creditors. If anything, this would tend to soften ex ante incentives. A natural implication of that literature would rather be that having bankruptcy procedures involving ex post ine¢ciencies would be desirable because then renegotiation in the shadow of bankruptcy can be used to increase ex ante e¢ciency. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic structure of the model. Section 3 discusses the benchmark case of one creditor. Section 4 develops the base case with two creditors, which is extended in Sections 5 and 6. Section 5 provides a justi…cation and more detailed institutional analysis of the bankruptcy process. Section 6 discusses the structure of the assumed debt renegotiation. Section 7 concludes.
The Model
A …rm can invest I units of funds at date 0. The …rm lives for two periods after that date. At date 1, the …rm has assets in place worth A which generate a cash ‡ow Y . Asset value A at date 1 is veri…able and deterministic, known to everybody in advance. Cash ‡ow, Y , is observable, but not veri…able, and accrues to the …rm's management. The assumption that only A is veri…able will play a crucial role in what follows, in particular, foreclosure on the …rm's property by the sheri¤ can only reach A, not Y . If the …rm is not liquidated at date 1, …nal …rm value V C is realized at date 2, where V C is a continuous random variable with cumulative density function F (V C ) and support [V ; V ]. We assume that F is di¤erentiable on (V ; V ) with density f , and will extend the de…nition of F and f to all of [0; V ] in the obvious way. In this paper we shall assume for simplicity that V C is non-veri…able (i.e. that management cannot credibly promise to transfer it to creditors at date 2); 1 in ongoing related work we relax this assumption.
Short term cash ‡ow Y is realized at date 1, too, and given by
At date 0, the …rm is run by a risk-neutral owner/manager who has no funds and raises them from external investors. Investors are risk-neutral and competitive. This implies that the …rm has all the bargaining power at the …nancing stage, for simplicity we will assume that it has it as well at the re…nancing stage. The …rm is …nanced by n¸1 investors who each put up I i > 0; P I i = I, i = 1; :::; n. We will mostly compare the one and two creditor cases. Investors provide …nance against the promise by management to repay D i ; i = 1; :::; n, at date 1. If an investor does not receive this payment at date 1, she has the right to foreclose on a certain part of the …rm's assets or force the …rm into bankruptcy, according to rules which we describe below.
From a contract-theoretic perspective, it is clear that investors' debt collection rights must depend on the set of creditors who attempt to collect.
where L is the set of all investors who want to collect. With only two outside investors, we can denote by L i · A the amount investor i can foreclose if the other investor does not foreclose, and by L b i the amount if both investors want to foreclose. Obviously, the total liquidation value cannot exceed the asset value:
Although the interactive nature of collection rights is theoretically obvious, it is less so in real world contracting, which points to an important role for bankruptcy. In fact, creditors' collection rights under unilateral liquidation, L i , may not be consistent in the sense that their sum may exceed the value of the …rm's assets, A, whereas the sum of individual collection rights when several creditors demand foreclosure can never exceed A. Real-world debt contracts typically specify individual, non-interactive collection rights (L i ), which are usually governed by debt collection law, but leave much of the creditors' rights when multilateral collection is attempted to bankruptcy law. An important practical reason for this is that "simultaneous foreclosure attempts" are physically almost impossible; there is always someone who acts …rst, even if others have the intention to take the same step. Therefore, the simultaneous move game which we introduce below to describe creditors' actions is a simpli…cation which collapses many possible sequential moves into one simultaneous move. We will take the view that an important function of bankruptcy law is to prevent unilateral foreclosure if other creditors have the same intention ("create simultaneity") and to determine the L i (L) ("make the L i 's consistent"), although the optimal contract which we are deriving will assume that creditors act simultaneously and will contain the L i (L) from the outset.
In this paper, we do not dwell on the speci…city of the bankruptcy procedure but rather try to analyze the optimal payo¤s to the …rm and its creditors in case of individual foreclosure or bankruptcy ("collective foreclosure"). At date 1, management is supposed to pay out D i to the creditors. If it does not do so, it defaults and bargains over the repayment. Following the capital structure literature discussed in the Introduction, we assume that such bargaining is bilateral, i.e. that creditors are too dispersed to negotiate collectively and with one voice with the debtor. The bargaining either leads to payments, to (individual) foreclosure or to bankruptcy. Formally, we describe this sequence of events by the following extensive form game between management and creditors:
1. Nature determines Y and V C .
2. Management pays out r i 2 f0; D i g.
2 , i = 1; :::; n.
Creditors i 2 I simultaneously choose to accept (a) or to (attempt to) foreclose (f ).
Denoting by L µ I the set of all creditors who do not accept p i , each creditor i 2 L receives ("liquidates") L i (L), and all other i 2 I receive their p i . If L · A is the total amount of assets liquidated, the …rm continues on the scale (1 ¡ L=A). This means that management obtains (1 ¡ L=A)V C at date 2.
Note that this assumption on payouts amounts to assuming that longterm …rm value is produced with constant returns to scale. Interest rates across periods are normalized to 0. In order to avoid having to consider several uninteresting cases later on, we impose some further restrictions on the parameters. First, we assume that management never wants to liquidate the …rm voluntarily:
V¸A.
(
Second, we assume that cash ‡ows in the the good state are su¢ciently high so as to avoid liquidity constraints in that state; speci…cally, we impose
3 The One Creditor Case
The model with one creditor is very simple but will serve as a useful benchmark to analyze the case with two creditors. In particular, with only one investor debt renegotiation is perfect and there is no need to reconcile competing debt collection claims in case of default and therefore no need for bankruptcy rules as described in the last section. As stated in Section 2, we assume that the …rm cannot pledge future …rm value V C at date 1, because this value is non-veri…able. Then a debt contract at date 0 just has to specify a repayment of D and the alternative liquidation right L for the creditor at date 1.
With probability 1¡q, …rm cash ‡ow is 0 and repayment is r = 0. In that case, the assets are liquidated and the investor receives L. With probability q cash ‡ow is Y H . The …rm then has the choice between paying out D, or strategic default and making a payment o¤er to the creditor. The payment o¤er p must be at least equal to L to be accepted by the creditor. If p¸L, the …rm's payo¤ is Y H ¡ p + V C , whereas with a payment of 0 (which is the best of all o¤ers strictly smaller than L) the payo¤ is Y H + (1 ¡ L=A)V C . The …rm will therefore prefer to pay, and set this payment equal to L, whenever V C ¡ L¸(1 ¡ L=A)V C , which is always satis…ed by (1).
To make the contract renegotiation-proof in the good state, we can therefore set D = L. Hence, under such a contract (L; D) the …rm's expected payo¤ will be
whereas the creditor will get L, either in cash or in asset value. Since L · A, this shows immediately that credit is unavailable if I > A. If I · A, competition among creditors will drive L down to I. Note that because the coe¢cient in front of L in (3) is strictly smaller than ¡1, minimizing L (subject to the investor's participation constraint) is also the e¢cient choice.
It is useful to summarize the above discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: With one creditor, there is lending if and only if I · A. In this case, there is no strategic default on debt in equilibrium, and the creditor gets D = L = I either in cash or through liquidation.
Note that with one creditor there is no role for bankruptcy law here beyond verifying the value of the liquidated assets and transferring them to the creditor.
Two Creditors: Optimal Contracts
We now take the same framework and assumptions as in the last section and assume two creditors instead of one. The case of two creditors is a simpli…ed illustration of a structure in which creditors are seperated and thus face coordination problems in bargaining with the …rm in case of default. Debt renegotiation, therefore, is more di¢cult than in the case of one creditor, because bargaining must be done individually and not collectively. As noted above, each creditor i has unilateral foreclosure rights L i and liquidation rights L b i when both demand foreclosure. To recall, unilateral foreclosure rights are the rights of a creditor if she decides to collect her debt unilaterally and the other creditor does not. Since only A can be seized in foreclosure or bankruptcy proceedings, we have
Consider …rst the case in which the …rm has nothing to pay out, Y = 0. Therefore, r 1 = r 2 = 0, and the creditors' problem in stage 5 of the game played at date 1 is given by the following simple matrix game Now consider the case Y = Y H . How much management will pay out and to what extent it actually wants to prevent liquidation, depends on the parameters and on the equilibrium played by the creditors in the foreclosure game, which, in turn, is in ‡uenced by the …rm's payout o¤er (p 1 ; p 2 ). The foreclosure game is given by the following modi…cation of matrix (4):
A necessary condition for (a; a) to be an equilibrium (i.e. for no liquidation to take place), is that p 1¸L1 and p 2¸L2 . Again, this equilibrium may not be unique for reasons of indi¤erence or because the L b i are high relative to the p i . We will rule out the …rst (trivial) type of multiplicity by resolving indi¤erences in such a way that the ex-ante optimization problem has a solution, as is standard practice in agency theory. In the present context this means that creditors accept the …rm's payment whenever it is weakly greater than their liquidation return. Under this assumption, (a; a) is the unique equilibrium of (5) if and only if
and
Going back one stage in the bargaining game, which of the four cells of (5) does management want to induce when it moves at date 1?
3 The continuation value for the …rm's managers is V C as de…ned above. By assumption (1) and because the …rm's long-term production is constant returns to scale, management prefers paying out a given amount over keeping it in cash and having the same amount foreclosed (on average and at the margin). This immediately implies that management prefers the (a; a) outcome with p 1 = L 1 over (f; a) and, symmetrically for the other o¤-diagonal. By assumption (2) and since L i · A, management can indeed make these payments.
Which of the two remaining cells does management prefer? Under the assumption that
condition (7) is automatically satis…ed if management sets the p i to their lowest levels satisfying (7),
By the argument given above, it can achieve this payo¤ as a unique equilibrium outcome. Management's payo¤ under (f; f ) is
where 
In other words, management prefers to pay out if the continuation value for management V C is higher than the threshold
3 Of course, at date 0 management prefers the (a; a) outcome because liquidation is ine¢cient. But at date 1, its preferences are guided by the L i , L b i , and no longer by overall e¢ciency considerations. 4 It is easily veri…ed that the optimal contract derived below satis…es (8).
and prefers bankruptcy otherwise. We now turn to the contract design problem at date 0. Assuming that L (11) does not hold) in the good cash ‡ow state. Letting
; the …rm's expected surplus at date 0 is, therefore,
The investors' participation constraints are
and the feasibility constraints
must hold. Letting L = L 1 + L 2 and summing (13), one gets
Hence, the contract optimization problem at date 0 can be reduced to
In order to solve this program, we can …rst simplify S 0 to
Note that (20) is very similar to the …rm's surplus in the one-creditor case, (3), the sole di¤erence being that the e¢ciency loss in the good cash ‡ow state is now split up into two terms, with probabilities µ and 1 ¡ µ, respectively. By substituting L for T as de…ned in (12), dropping additive terms, and multiplying by ¡A, problem (16)- (19) can be equivalently written as
As this program clearly shows, the investors' participation constraint is binding (this is obvious a priori: there is no need to leave a rent to investors ex ante). Using this to eliminate L b and remembering that µ = 1 ¡ F (T ), we …nally get
Here, (26) is the upper constraint on L b (the second inequality of (18)), (27) is the lower constraint on L (the …rst inequality in (19)), and (28) is the upper constraint on L (the second inequality in (19)).
The two programs (21)- (24) and (25)- (28) are equivalent: the solutions (T ¤ ; L b¤ ) of the former yield solutions T ¤ of the latter and vice versa by using the participation constraint
Program (25)- (28) is highly non-linear, but it has the advantage of being a problem in only one (real) variable. On the other hand, program (21)- (24) is two-dimensional, but o¤ers more economic insights. For the formal characterisation of the solutions and their existence the one-dimensional problem is simpler to analyse.
Proposition 2 (Debt Capacity): Problem (25)-(28) has a solution if
(1 + q ¡ qF (2A))A¸I:
Proof: Figure 1 depicts the left-hand sides of (26) and (28) as functions of T which intersect at T = 2A. By (29), this intersection point lies above I, hence the constraint set of problem (25)- (28) is not empty. It clearly is compact and the objective function is continuous.¥ (29) is a lower bound for the …rm's debt capacity (the largest expected gross return the …rm can credibly pledge to two creditors under any constract). An investment below this threshold can be …nanced, any amount above it may or may not be …nanced, depending on the distribution of long-term returns, F .
Condition (29) is intuitive in several respects. Going back to the twodimensional problem (21)-(24), the participation constraint (22) shows that the …rm's debt capacity is given by
The derivative of (30) with respect to T is
which is strictly positive for T < V . Because the maximand in (30) is strictly increasing in L b , (1 + q)A is an upper bound for the …rm's debt capacity: the creditors can never get more than all assets in the bad state and cash of double that value in the good state. Condition (29) shows that this reasoning actually gives the exact debt capacity if V¸2A. In this case, by (31), increasing L b and T all the way up to their maximum values (A and 2A, respectively) maximises the investors' returns in (30). On the other hand, if V < 2A, the debt capacity cannot be as high as (1 + q)A because for T = 2A the incentive for strategic default for low values of V C provides a countervailing e¤ect. In fact, in this case, if I is su¢ciently large (but still smaller than (1 + q)A) and the distribution of V C su¢ciently concentrated on [V ; 2A]; a solution to problem (25)- (28) may not exist.
5 Then the incentive to default strategically can be so strong that investments I > _
A cannot be …nanced. However, under the conditions of Proposition 2, if V > 2A, debt capacity is strictly greater than I, and some investments that could not be …nanced with one creditor will be …nanced with two.
Here, the ability of the debtor to pledge his assets to each individual creditor leads to a strictly higher debt capacity than in the one creditor case. This implies in turn that when the cost of capital is higher than the value of the assets, a project will be …nanced only with multiple creditors and not with a single creditor because of the higher leverage provided by multiple creditors.
In fact, a simple consequence of the investors' participation constraint (15) and Proposition 2 is that the …rm will be over-leveraged with respect to its asset base whenever there is …nance for projects with I > A.
Corollary (Over-Leverage): Whenever I > A and the project is …nanced, the face value of debt exceeds the …rm's asset value: L > A.
A further inspection of the two-dimensional problem (21)- (24) (as in Figure 1 ), i.e. I > A + q( V ¡ A) and F has su¢cient mass to the left of 2A, then the curve of (1 + q ¡ qF (2A))A will never rise above I. In particular, this happens if this graph peaks at T = V , which will be true if f (T ) > is desirable. However, the participation constraint (22) shows that this may come at a cost in terms of T . As shown before, the derivative of the left hand side of (22) with respect to T is essentially (up to a factor A) given by (31), which is typically not monotonic in T (the countervailing e¤ect comes from the fact that lowering L b worsens the …rm's incentive to repay in the good state). However, if T · V the e¤ect is unambiguous. In this case we have µ = 1, because unilateral collection rights L (which determine payout in the good state) are su¢ciently small relative to bankruptcy liquidation rights L b for management never to default strategically. Therefore, the objective function of the one-dimensional problem (25) simpli…es to
which is strictly decreasing in T for all T > 0. In the one-dimensional problem, the parties therefore want to choose T maximally in [0; V ]. Whether they can do so, depends on the constraints (26) and (28). An inspection of these constraints shows that (26) is slack for T > 2A and (28) for T < 2A. If I < A, the upper constraint on L b , (26), never binds; investment requirements are so low that it is always possible to satisfy the investors by liquidating less than A in bankruptcy. If I > A, the constraint restricts the choice of T ; in fact, as Figure 1 shows, no T < A+(I ¡ A)=q satis…es it. This implies that if V < A + (I ¡ A)=q, any solution to the contracting problem must have T > V , i.e. feature strategic default with some probability.
If 2A¸V¸A + (I ¡ A)=q, the choice of T = V is feasible, and its optimality depends on the right-hand derivative of the objective function of problem (25) at T = V (the left-hand derivative is given by (32) and is negative, but F and therefore the objective is not di¤erentiable at T = V ). Straightforward calculation shows that this right-hand derivative is given by
If this value is negative (which is the case if f(V ) is su¢ciently small), it is optimal to increase T beyond V , which again means to induce strategic default with some probability.
If V > 2A, the constraint on L, (28), becomes relevant and a similar argument applies. Going through the analysis yields the following result.
Proposition 3 (Strategic Default): Assume (29). Then there is no strategic default under the optimal two-creditor contract if I > 2qA and V¸2
. There is always strategic default with some probability if V < A + (I ¡ A)=q. In all other cases there is strategic default with positive probability if the right derivative of (25) at T = V , (33), is strictly negative.
Proof: If I > 2qA and V¸2 (see Figure 1) . The other cases are straightforward.¥ Finally, it is easy to show that the constraint on L b , (26), never binds at the optimum except for the case where the debtor must pledge the full debt capacity. Hence, the debtor retains some of the assets even after bankruptcy. This is due to the fact that continuation in the present model is always ef…cient and that there are constant returns to scale. Therefore, the parties have a strong ex ante incentive not to punish the debtor too hard in case of bankruptcy. This result will be modi…ed when continuation can be ine¢-cient or when returns to scale are not constant. However, the basic message remains valid: if the debtor has a comparative advantage using the assets, it is ex ante costly to separate her from them ex post, and, therefore, an optimal contract will aim at reducing this incidence as much as possible. This insight, simple as it is, is in sharp contrast with traditional legal reasoning that demands to satisfy creditors …rst in case of bankruptcy.
Proposition 4 (Deviation from Absolute Priority): If I < (1 + q ¡ qF (2A))A, then the …rm is not fully liquidated in bankruptcy: L b < A.
Proof: The objective (25) is strictly decreasing for any value T at which (26) binds.¥ To summarize, we have shown in this section that having multiple creditors allows to enhance the debt capacity of a …rm by overleveraging its assets. This induces strategic default in equilibrium above a threshold level T of V C where the debtor trades o¤ the bene…t of continuing the …rm with the cost of paying out the creditors. The optimal debt contract will typically not involve full liquidation in case of default in order to optimally trade o¤ a reduced ine¢ciency of liquidation after a liquidity default with an increased incentive for strategic default.
It is useful at this stage to compare our results with those of Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) . They also compare optimal debt contracts with one and multiple creditors in an incomplete-contract framework. In their model, having multiple creditors reduces the incentive for strategic default whereas in our model, it increases the incentives for strategic default. The mechanisms are the following. In their model, when there are multiple creditors, complementary assets are collateralized to di¤erent creditors and there is no overleveraging possible as in our model. Because of asset complementarity, following a default creditors can jointly get a higher price when selling them to an outside buyer. This implies that the debtor must pay creditors a higher price to prevent them from choosing liquidation. This in turn dampens the incentives for strategic default. The price creditors get under liquidation thus varies endogenously with the number of creditors. In our model, the liquidation value of the …rm is …xed but it is the equilibrium debt repayments that vary with the number of creditors. Having multiple creditors, each holding individual foreclosure rights, is a mechanism to credibly commit to higher repayments compared to the single creditor case. These higher repayments allow to increase the debt capacity, but also increase at the margin the incentives for strategic default and lead to observe strategic default in equilibrium, a phenomenon absent in the Bolton-Scharfstein (1996) model.
Bankruptcy, Debt Collection and Priority
In the base model of Section 4 we have assumed that a simultaneous attempt by creditors to collect their debt automatically triggers bankruptcy. In reality, of course, bankruptcy must be triggered by someone, and the base model is silent on this issue. In this section we generalize the base model to a model in which bankruptcy is not an automatic consequence of simultaneous debt collection, but the result of a deliberate decision by a creditor. This will at the same time provide a new rationale for bankruptcy and shed light on the role of seniority.
In order to de…ne the more general model we must …rst rede…ne and reinterpret the model of Section 4. The main change to that model is the de…nition and interpretation of simultaneous foreclosure in the debt collection games (4) and (5). Instead of the bankruptcy payments L b i assumed in the case of (f; f) there, we will now assume that simultaneous foreclosure results in an uncoordinated run for the assets, in which the …rst to collect his debt liquidates L i , and the second the rest, A ¡ L i . Assuming that each creditor has the same probability of being …rst and that L 1 + L 2¸A , the payo¤ matrix becomes
where p 1 = p 2 = 0 in the case of Y = 0.
In this framework, which represents a "pre-bankruptcy", primitive state, ex-post interactions and ex-ante contracting will be as in Section 4, with the exception that L b = A is …xed exogenously. This simpli…es the original program (21)- (24) considerably, but the resulting contract will not be optimal, as shown in Proposition 4. The reason is that the deadweight loss through complete liquidation more than outweighs the improved incentives for payout in the good state. Ex ante it is therefore optimal to reduce the threat of liquidation from A to L b . This can be done by introducing bankruptcy into the model; and more precisely, by giving each creditor the right to trigger bankruptcy when the …rm defaults on its payment towards him. Bankruptcy then means that individual debt collection is no longer allowed, and creditors receive
In the good cash ‡ow state, this rule will not change the …rm's payments, because these are determined by the individual claims L i . In particular, a creditor who observes that another creditor pursues the …rm will not trigger bankruptcy as long as V C¸T ¤ , for he knows that the other creditor will not liquidate in equilibrium. Yet, the rule will change the payout behaviour in the good state, because the …rm knows that when defaulting it will get away with a liquidation of L b instead of A. In this case, and equally in the bad state, creditor i observing the attempt to foreclose by creditor j will call bankruptcy if this makes him better o¤ than waiting, i.e. if
Adding up (35) for i = 1; 2 yields the joint condition L b + L > 2A, which may be satis…ed by the solution to problem (21)- (24), L ¤ and L b¤ , but need not. If L ¤ and L b¤ satisfy the joint condition, then an optimal contract with bankruptcy can rule out a run for the assets by either creditor by setting each creditor's L b i su¢ciently high. If the joint condition is not satis…ed, this will not be possible for both creditors, and at least one creditor will have an incentive to run for the assets even in the presence of a bankruptcy rule. In this case, a further contractual remedy is needed, which can be obtained by making one creditor senior.
Seniority means that the individual claim of the senior creditor has precedence over the other claim in bankruptcy. In this case,
for the junior. This arrangement has the advantage of being compatible with the optimum values L ¤ and L b¤ derived in Section 4, but it does not necessarily eliminate runs for the assets. In fact, if L i > L b¤ even the senior creditor gets less in bankruptcy than when running for the assets. Yet, this ‡aw can easily be remedied by choosing L i · L b¤ (remember that the analysis in Section 4 has …xed only the aggregate liquidation values). Now the senior creditor has no incentive to run for his assets, not even when he observes the attempt to foreclose by the other creditor; he simply calls bankruptcy. In fact, this is what is observed in reality: if bankruptcy is triggered by a creditor, it is typically triggered by a senior creditor.
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The above discussion can be summed up in the following proposition: 
Individual and collective renegotiation
The results on higher debt capacity under multiple creditors derived in Section 4 depend on the fact that creditors have unilateral foreclosure rights that they can exercise in case of default, independently of what other creditors decide. These rights should be seen as an important element of investor protection. The renegotiation procedure modeled in Section 4 emphasises the e¤ect of these rights since renegotiation was assumed to be done on an individual basis. The ensuing prisoner's dilemma situation forces the debtor to 6 There is one small caveat to this reasoning: should the senior creditor try to foreclose individually (for which he has no strict incentive), then the junior creditor j has no incentives to call bankruptcy, because
(liquidating individually after the senior creditor is more pro…table). But since this issue arises only out of indi¤erence, it poses no formal problem for the model; in fact, the feature that junior creditors have less incentive to call bankruptcy is highly realistic. respect contractual claims as given by individual foreclosure rights whenever he wants to avoid strategic default. The key assumption in this approach is that creditors are too dispersed to renegotiate the debt contract collectively. Only bankruptcy brings all the contracting parties again together at one table and has the important function of reconciling their liquidation claims. This is the classical "vis attractiva" of bankruptcy.
Yet, it is theoretically conceivable and possible in practice that the debtor can unite the group of creditors, or their representatives, and extract from them joint concessions under the threat of bankruptcy. If such workouts are frictionless, the theory presented in Sections 4 and 5 collapses into the onecreditor-case discussed in Section 3. More generally, for any theory in which multiple creditors have a disciplining function for the debtor, frictionless all-inclusive negotiations in the shadow of bankruptcy present a conceptual problem. In our view, however, frictions in such negotiations can be substantial, and, in particular, increase with the number of creditors. One classical reason for these frictions is, of course, the hold up problem of the individual creditor, which is precisely the reason for institutionalised bankruptcy rules as discussed in Section 5. Another reason is the legal uncertainty accompanying out-of-court debt renegotiations, if individual creditors have the possibility of contesting the new arrangement in court.
How likely are courts to e¤ectively uphold individual claims from the earlier contract? It turns out that there is no simple answer to this question, and the answer appears to change over time, at least in the legal tradition of the United States. Coercive o¤ers have been a concern of courts for centuries. In the common law tradition the problem goes back at least to the old contract law doctrine of Foakes v. Beer, 9 App.Cas. 605 (1884). In this case a creditor had accepted a delayed payment on an instalment basis but then charged interest. The court ruled that the creditor could repudiate such an agreement if it was not supported by "consideration" (i.e., some concession from the debtor). Courts have since tried to establish what constitutes consideration. The problem has been that almost anything, e.g., if the debtor o¤ered to pay the lower amount slightly earlier than originally agreed, could count as consideration.
Courts have also over time become concerned that hand-tying may prevent mutually bene…cial renegotiation. A complete ban on renegotiation would, of course, rule out workouts, or composition, outside bankruptcy altogether. Consequently, courts in the United States have been increasingly reluctant to interfere with the freedom of contract and found consideration in the agreement of more than one creditor to accept an o¤er. Repudiation is now primarily limited to situations where the creditor can show that she was under duress. An example would be if the creditor signed with a gun pointed at her head or were subject to some other threat where the creditor did not have remedy. A threat to …le for bankruptcy would hardly qualify (unless for the unlikely event that it could be shown that the debtor had no intention of actually …ling).
7 In fact, it seems from our reading that courts are more concerned with coercion of debtors, rather than creditors, in duress.
Courts have nevertheless tried to safeguard against coercive o¤ers in other ways. For example, they have allowed repudiation from creditors who did not participate in the agreement. This measure was used against equity receivership, the 19th Century precursor to Chapter 11. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 also required unanimity among a¤ected creditors for exchange o¤ers to be accepted (Roe, 1987) . When creditors are heterogenous and widely dispersed, and not necessarily entirely predictable, obtaining consensus may be very di¢cult to obtain. Another possible ground for repudiation would be fraudulent conveyances, i.e., transfers of assets away from creditors or to one creditor at the expense of others. However, fraudulent conveyances require that the debtor "delay, hinder or defraud" a creditor. Paying one creditor ahead of another would normally not su¢ce if the transaction was transparent.
To summarize this discussion, the possibility of joint renegotiations raises important concerns about the value of individual foreclosure rights in allowing debtors to commit ex ante. Courts face a di¢cult tradeo¤ between respecting such rights and allowing mutually bene…cial renegotiation. However, the greater the number of creditors, the more di¢cult are such renegotiations to achieve in the …rst place, and the less likely they are to go uncontested.
Conclusion
We have analyzed the role of bankruptcy law in an incomplete-contracts perspective where continuation of a defaulting …rm is ex post e¢cient. If cash ‡ow is not veri…able and only the collateral value of the …rm is veri…able, then when a …rm borrows from a single creditor and has all bargaining power, its debt capacity is limited to the value of its collateral. The reason is that the creditor can never expect to receive more than the collateral value in liquidation and in renegotiation. However, when a …rm borrows from more than one creditor, it can increase its debt capacity by pledging its collateral value to more than one creditor by giving each the right to foreclose on its veri…able assets. This creates a commitment for the …rm to pay out more in good states to prevent the exercise of individual foreclosure rights and thus helps in raising the …rm's debt capacity. Having multiple creditors thus helps to reduce the negative e¤ects of contractual incompleteness by distinguishing between individual foreclosure rights and joint liquidation rights achieved under bankruptcy. A bankruptcy rule is necessary in order to make individual claims consistent in case of default and to prevent value reducing runs for the assets in case of default. Furthermore, depending on the parameters, it may be necessary to make one creditor senior.
In our model, all these results are derived as parts of an optimal ex-ante contract between debtor and creditors. Formally, there is, therefore, no need for a law. In practice, however, there may well be, if individuals are unable to join and write contracts specifying procedures of collective behavior. In fact, this is the classical Rawlsian justi…cation of legislation as a substitute for contracting in the "original position" (Rawls, 1971) , an approach to law, and bankruptcy law in particular, that is wide-spread in legal thinking. The classic text of Jackson (1986) , for example, when exploring the foundations of bankruptcy law, only argues that a "collective system of debt collection law" is needed, relegating the issue of private contracting to a footnote. 8 Conceptually, our approach to the foundations of bankruptcy law does not go beyond this, we only make the hypothetical private contract explicit.
Further research is necessary to better characterize the e¤ect of di¤erent renegotiation procedures, the role of courts in intervening in private contracts, and several other issues. The model in this paper can, however, be used to deepen our understanding of various bankruptcy laws both from the perspective of ex post and ex ante e¢ciency. Ultimately, this may contribute to a comprehensive comparative analysis of the e¤ects of various bankruptcy laws across countries and across time. We hope the framework set in this paper can contribute to develop such a research program.
